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a) “I have failed as a scientist, as a researcher. I have amended my research 
data and faked research. Not once, but several times and not for a brief 
moment, but for a prolonged period. I realize that this behavior has shocked 
and angered my colleagues and my profession, social psychology. I am 
ashamed and I regret this…” (social psychologist Diederik Stapel’s response 
to interim report on academic misconduct) 
 
b) “As the director of S-21, I did not dare to seek any alternatives to obeying 
the orders from the upper echelon, despite knowing that carrying them out 
would lead to the loss of thousands of lives. At present, I have the deepest 
sorrow and regret, and I feel ashamed and uneasy. As a perpetrator, I know 
that I am personally guilty before the entire Cambodian people and nation, 
before the families of all the victims who lost their lives at S-21 and before my 
own family, some of whom also lost their lives.” (Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch, 
Khmer rouge executioner) 
 
c) “We are sorry. The News of the World was in the business of holding others 
to account. It failed when it came to itself.  We are sorry for the serious 
wrongdoing that occurred. We are deeply sorry for the hurt suffered by the 
individuals affected. We regret not acting faster to sort things out. I realize that 
simply apologising is not enough. Our business was founded on the idea that 
a free and open press should be a positive force in society. We need to live 
up to this…” (signed by Rupert Murdoch, full-page News of the World ‘sorry’ 
ad) 	  
d) “… I informed the Securitate in writing about some of [my] friends and 
some of my acquaintances, without warning them, without confessing to them 
post-festum until my writing of this text, without apologizing, without assuming 
publicly this shameful past … Ethically and morally, confession and 
repentance are coming too late: to the gravity of my deeds from 25-30 years 
ago, one can add the indefensible gravity of silence, of life lived in lies and 
duplicity…” (Sorin Antohi, public intellectual, on his collaboration with the 
Securitate, the communist Romanian secret police) 	  	  
	   3	  
  
We live in an ‘age of apology’ (Brooks, 1999). The public expressions of 
‘regret’ that open this chapter are only some examples of a broader trend that 
includes (but is not limited to) collective (formal) political apologies for 
historical injustice (Augoustinos, Hastie & Wright, 2011; Celermajer, 2009), 
individual contrition for past wrongdoing of public figures and politicians  
(Bauer, 2009; Blaney and Benoit, 2001; Payne, 2008; Simons, 2000; Tileagă, 
2009b, 2011) or apologetic efforts of organizations (Benoit, 1995; Brinson and 
Benoit, 1999).  How do we go about researching these ubiquitous instances of 
public behavior? This chapter critically appraises conventional ways of 
understanding and interpreting apologia and puts forward an alternative 
account grounded in understanding apologia as discourse. This chapter will 
make the case for the merit and potential contribution of discourse analysis to 
understanding politics of ‘regret’ in action. In doing so, I turn repeatedly to 
data that are part of a wider project investigating the social construction of the 
communist/post-communist past in talk and text (Tileagă 2009a, b; 2012), 
especially a public apologia of collaboration with the Securitate, the former 
communist Romanian secret police.       
It is usually argued that apologies occur in a range of forms, from 
“canonically explicit to ambiguously indirect” (Lakoff, 2001, p. 201). The 
conventional wisdom invites us to identify rhetorical strategies of self-defense 
(Benoit, 1995) or the internal psychology of the person (Miller, 1999, 2003). 
This chapter argues that apologias are more than the sum of ways of 
interpreting them. They express sociocultural meanings, especially the 
meaning of what it means to be ‘sorry’ (LeCouteur et al., 2001). They orient to 
the cultural norm of remedial work on social relationships through language 
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(Goffman, 1971; Owen, 1983). The language of social and political life is 
primarily a language of events, social relations, categories, psychological 
states, stake, interest, etc. (Edwards, 1997). Public apologies mobilize the 
past in the present: events, people, identities, categories, social relations, 
institutions, memory (individual/social/organizational). Apologia displaces the 
(confessional) self into the social, opening a public space of judgment. 
Apologia is a social activity; politicians, broadcasters, etc. issue apologies, 
they release statements: public apology is a performative discursive order1. 
Apologia is a social product, the product of social and discursive 
accomplishments, socio-communicative practices involved in social-relational 
(accountability) management. Making ‘moral amends’ or accomplishing ‘moral 
repair’ is part and parcel of reconstructing, refashioning, restoring moral 
relations between people (Tavuchis, 1991; Walker, 2006). Apologia is 
animated or activated in the socio-communicative context of their use. They 
project a variety of alignments, footings, in relation to utterances, arguments, 
personal and social identities, audiences.  	  	  
 
Image restoration 
 
In interpersonal contexts (relationships) the framework of apologies is the 
negotiation of personal (moral) responsibility and managing threats to face 
(Goffman, 1971). Speech act theory and politeness theory concentrate on the 
‘felicity’ conditions for apologies (e.g. Austin, 1962; Jaworski, 1994; Kampf, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 As Lynch and Bogen (1996) note, a pervasive feature of public avowals is that they are 
usually given ‘for the record’. They can be summarized, quoted and ‘recycled’ in news 
reports, newspapers and so on. 
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2009). In conversation analytic terms (e.g., Robinson, 2004), the focus is 
mostly on “explicit” apologies that are said to present a sequential 
organization. In the public sphere, maintaining a positive ‘image’ is at the core 
of various attempts to understand (public) apologies. Rhetorical approaches 
to image restoration (see Benoit, 1995 for an overview) distinguish between 
several stances of self-defense. In an attempt to integrate seminal interests in 
rhetorical strategies of image restoration and social psychological concerns 
with impression management Benoit’s (1995) proposes a theory of ‘image 
restoration’ that starts from two vernacular truths: “communication is a goal-
directed activity” and “maintaining a favorable reputation is one of the central 
goals of communication”2. Benoit reviews a plethora of image restoration 
strategies: denial (simple denial, shifting the blame) evading responsibility 
(through scapegoating, defeasibility, accident, good intentions), reducing 
offensiveness (bolstering, minimization, differentiation, compensation, 
transcendence, attack accuser), corrective action, mortification, and charts the 
presence of these strategies in “image restoration discourse” in a variety of 
contexts: press statements of politicians (Benoit, 2006), corporate crisis 
management (Benoit, 1997), government discourse on SARS (Zhang and 
Benoit, 2009), or the Queen’s ‘image repair’ discourse occasioned by the 
death of Princess Diana (Benoit and Brinson, 1999)3. Other researchers 
conceive of apologies as rhetorical ‘events’ (Simons, 2000).  They point to the 
existence of rhetorical, pragmatic and sociocultural factors that constrain the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Benoit treats apologies as communicative acts “intended to attain goals important to the 
communicators who perform them” (Benoit, 1995, p. 67). Simply put, what Benoit calls ‘image 
restoration discourse’ is about “restoring or protecting one’s reputation” (p. 71). 
3 Benoit’s approach falls into what Meier (1998) calls “speaker-supportive” perspectives that 
conceive apologies as “instruments of impression management or image restoration” (p. 221). 
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speaker to construct his or her apology in a very specific way. Each linguistic 
and rhetorical choice has implications for other (potential) rhetorical choices 
(Simons, 2000). What could have been said is as important as what was 
actually said. Simons (2000) takes the example of Clinton’s August 1998 
apology and analyzing what he calls the “situational logic of strategic 
response” (p. 441), he concludes that “Clinton managed his predicament "not 
badly," but not as well as he could have, under the circumstances” (p. 449) 
(see also Fetzer and Bull, 2012 on concerns with communicative competence 
of politicians). Simons’ analysis (as that of Benoit) retains a focus on 
prescriptive (felicitous) aspects of apologies rather than a concern with 
situated rhetoric and actual use of language (Billig, 1996).  	  
 
 
Apologia as discourse  	  
	  
Image restoration strategies and offense-remedial actions are part of the inter-
subjective arsenal of defensive rhetoric of individuals and organizations. 
Public apologies are part of “rituals which leave space for dignified restoration 
of the harm resulting from wrongdoing” (Braithwaite, 2000, p. 129)4. The 
effectiveness or ineffectiveness of a ‘remedial’ action is a contingent yet 
relatively stable product of the multi-subjective rhetorical context in which it is 
produced. Social actors may approach the same issue from different 
perspectives: multi-subjective agreement, as well as disagreement is the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Public apologies can be also conceived as self-degradation or identity demotion ceremonies 
(Garfinkel, 1956). The repentance rituals of politicians and public figures create and 
reproduce a very specific sort of restorative, community justice (Braithwaite, 1999) where the 
apology is the necessary (and sometimes, sufficient) condition for successful reintegration.    
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intimate fabric of social and political life (Billig, 1996). What Schudson (2004) 
calls ‘multidimensional social resources’, such as trust and reputation, a range 
of discursive devices, textual networks of testimonies and opinion (public and 
private), rumors, personal and official documents, are available to social 
actors to construct version of events, selves, contexts, to manage personal, 
group or institutional responsibility. This opens the way for the study of public 
apologies as ways of managing moral identity and moral accountability 
(Tileagă, 2009b; 2011), opens the way for appreciating multiple ’confessional 
forms’ (Payne, 2008) and the multiple identities that social actors inhabit, 
enact, defend, deny.  
Public apologies are perceived more as image restoration moves but 
less as social performances engendering their own dialogical context, public 
response and associated social and ideological consequences for self and 
others. There are four methodological principles that inform treating and 
analyzing apologia as discourse. Three originate in discursive psychology 
(Hepburn and Wiggins, 2007; Billig, in press; Potter, in press; Edwards, in 
press). The last principle originates in sociocultural psychology (Middleton and 
Brown, 2005, 2007). I will briefly address these in turn.  
Discursive psychology conceives of socio-communicative practice as 
moral order (Edwards 2003, 2006; Potter, in press; Edwards, in press) and is 
concerned with people’s own perspectives, orientations to features of 
subjectivity and the objective world in the course of practical engagement with 
the world (Edwards, 1997, 2006). What lies at the core of discursive 
psychology’s intellectual and empirical project is a way of doing psychology 
that understands discourse as social action.  DP offers an alternative way of 
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conceiving the mutual relationship between people, practices and institutions 
(cf. Hepburn and Wiggins, 2007).  
The first methodological principle is that of relying on naturalistic data 
in studying psychological and social phenomena. According to Potter (in 
press), the notion of naturalistic marks a contrast from ‘got up’ materials such 
as vignettes, experimental protocols, discourse completion-tests, 
retrospective self-reports, role-play (see Meier, 1998 for the range of 
elicitation methods in apology research).  An emphasis is placed on the 
collection and analysis of naturally occurring, publicly available materials and 
accounts that (would) exist without the intervention of the researcher (letters 
to newspapers, talk shows, official documents, etc.). Naturalistic materials 
provide access to participants’ own orientations and displays. The analytic 
topic is the description and treatment of disclosure, apology, expression of 
‘regret’ by members of society, not its ‘objectivity’ for us as researchers (cf. 
Eglin and Hester, 2003). The second methodological principle follows from the 
first. Naturalistic materials facilitate the study of vernacular and elite social 
practices. Discursive psychology treats and studies talk and texts as social 
practices. Discourse psychologists start with practices themselves: people 
interacting with another in mundane settings, the writing of texts in institutional 
settings, etc.  
The third methodological principle is linked to considering the 
discursive organization and action-oriented nature of accounts, and taking into 
consideration how talk and text is organized so as to potentially persuade 
hearers and readers towards a specified set of ‘readings’ and ‘interpretations’ 
(see Potter, in press; Hepburn and Wiggins, 2007). Discursive psychologists 
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have focused their study on the subtle, complex, context-sensitive nature of 
talk and text and its orientation to social action. People do things with their 
talk, they make accusations, justify their actions, ask questions, excuse, 
persuade etc. People use language to do things, to construct versions of the 
world depending upon the function of their talk.  
The fourth methodological principle is related to how sociocultural 
psychologists treat individual and collective memory. For sociocultural 
psychologists processes of remembering, forgetting, suppressing, distorting 
memories and histories are seen as public, culturally mediated experiences 
and actions (cf. Middleton and Brown, 2005, 2007; Wertsch, 2002, 2007). 
Individual and collective representations of recent personal and national 
history are not seen as given, or pre-existing, but rather are multivocal and 
multimodal, circulating and circulated by active agents at various levels of 
social organization (individual/group/institutional) through the use of 
material/cultural tools (e.g. narratives, written records, social technologies) (cf. 
Wertsch, 2007; Brown, 2012). Sociocultural psychologists propose a shift in 
our understanding of remembering. As Brown (2012) cogently argues, 
“remembering is a social practice that enables the production of subjectivity 
rather than the exercise of a mental faculty alone. Persons invoke and 
collectively negotiate versions of the past, drawing on the accounts of others 
as well as a potential host of other mediating objects, including common 
narratives, “official history,” and artefacts varying from mementos, diaries, and 
photographs to public records” (p. 239).  
In addressing these methodological principles I draw upon data that 
are part of a wider project investigating the social construction of the 
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communist/post-communist past in talk and text (Tileagă 2009a, b; Tileagă, 
2011, 2012, in press). The context is that of the (ongoing) public release of 
the Securitate’s files (the former communist secret police) in Romania and 
ensuing revelations and public debate around the moral/deviant ‘careers’, 
created and negotiated out of engaging with personal and institutional 
accountabilities in relation to the communist recent past.  A society’s hierarchy 
of respectability and credibility came under scrutiny when, under the threat of 
detection or simply from a voluntary impulse to (finally) ‘tell the truth’, public 
confessions of collaboration flooded the public space. Most of the public 
confessions of collaboration featured in media and news interviews, 
newspaper articles, letters sent to newspapers, radio and television panel 
debates. This paper focuses on an exploration of a specific public confession 
(that of a Romanian public intellectual) of having been an informer for the 
Securitate (the former Romanian communist secret police) in an open letter to 
a national newspaper (on the case background see Tileagă, 2009b and 2011, 
on the broader context of coming to terms with the past in Romania, see 
Tismăneanu, 2008).  	  
 
Discursive analysis  
 
By deciding to focus on an open letter to a newspaper I have followed two of 
the previously outlined methodological principles: using naturalistic materials 
and starting with social practices themselves, in this case, the writing of texts 
and management of public accountability. As argued earlier, naturalistic 
materials provide access to participants’ own orientations and displays. I was 
mostly concerned with the discursive ‘choices’ that the writer himself makes in 
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writing the apology, rather than my own assumptions regarding what counts 
or constitutes an apology.  The letter is divided by the writer in two parts - the 
‘Essence’ and the ‘Existence’. The letter is described by the newspaper as a 
‘harrowing document’. It is placed under ‘Current affairs’ (Actualitate) with the 
gist prefaced by the author’s name: ‘Am turnat la Securitate’ (I have been an 
informer for the Securitate). The letter (and apologia contained in it) is 
suggestive of an identity transformation. From the outset the writer declares 
himself to be a certain sort of degraded person, a person of a lower identity in 
the relevant group's scheme of social types – an ‘informer’.  
Extracts [1]-[3], below, come from the “Essence”. One can see how 
from the onset, disclosure, apologia and moral identity are tied up through the 
use of organizationally relevant categories “informer” and “Securitate”.  
 
[1] “… I informed the Securitate in writing about some of [my] friends and some of my 
acquaintances, without warning them, without confessing to them post-festum until 
my writing of this text, without apologizing, without assuming publicly this shameful 
past” 
 
[2] “I informed on them sometimes, with death in my soul, but I never betrayed them: 
I have not been an agent provocateur, I have not received missions of any kind, I 
have not been promised and there have not been advantages created for me … 
during all this time, I remained hostile to the Securitate and the party-state” 
 
[3] “Ethically and morally, confession and repentance are coming too late: to the 
gravity of my deeds from 25-30 years ago, one can add the indefensible gravity of 
silence, of life lived in lies and duplicity…” 
 
 
 
Notice how in extract [1] moral accountability for actions and moral character 
are managed through the invocation of the membership categories “friends” 
and “acquaintances” that can be said to imply a set of category-bound 
activities and a locus for rights and obligations. The absence of moral courses 
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of action in relation to significant others is made relevant. Public disclosure (or 
rather, its absence) is made accountable here. The orientation is to an 
underlying ethical issue (the sin of omission): failing to confess to those for 
whom the act (of confessing) matters.  
Through the use of “sometimes”, the metaphor “with death in my soul” 
and the extreme case formulation “never” (see extract [2]) the reader is 
provided with a formulation of a general disposition to act in a particular way. 
“Sometimes” serves to portray the relative character of the state of affairs, as 
well as the frequency of the practice. “I never betrayed them” is a way of 
normalizing actions and character by positioning the self in opposition to a 
potentially damaging moral identity: “betraying your friends”. It is not the 
action of informing on close friends and acquaintances that is being denied 
here, but rather the potentially available/relevant moral inferences, moral 
identities attached to it. By using the term “betrayal” the writer displays a 
reflexive awareness of a breach of a social moral order (what one could call 
‘trust’). “Betrayal” is a members’ lay term that is made relevant in the public 
language-game of constructing an explanation for wrongdoing, minimizing 
and negotiating accountability for one's deeds. An alternative moral identity 
and moral character is constituted by denying other available 
characteriological formulations (e.g., “agent provocateur”), morally implicative 
descriptions that can speak of one’s “tendencies, dispositions, moral nature, 
desires and intentions” (Edwards 2006: 498). We can see how the writer 
treats the social order of persons, actions, breaches, underlying motives for 
action, as fundamentally a moral order. In doing so, he can build a platform for 
managing personal and public accountability. 
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Extract [3] can be seen as a display of a shared cultural understanding 
of the meaning of ‘saying sorry’ (LeCouteur 2001). The writer orients to the 
cultural relevance of the sequence of transgression – confession – penitence 
–absolution. He also orients to the idea that without a sense of moral self, 
without a morally penitent and redemptive narrative, there can be no 
confession; without both internal and external moral constraints, an 
exploration of selfhood and repentance is not possible. Confession permits 
both the staging and performance of self-disclosure and penitence; it 
produces the public scene of guilt and morality play. A play of self-disclosure 
and penitence is essential to the project of making a confession and 
constructing an apologia. There is a sense that concerns with moral identity 
and moral character operates here as background “scheme of interpretation 
and expression” (cf. Schütz 1967).  
It would be relatively easy to identify the writer’s account as grounded 
in image reparation or restoration strategies. But that would not tell the whole 
story. The discursive analysis of the kind I have been employing points to a 
different approach by which one can understand public apologies. Public 
apologies throw up matters grounded in our logical ‘grammar’ of using 
ordinary language concepts, and the particular common sense assumptions 
about persons, memory, activities, social relations, and as a consequence, 
they need to be studied in relation to those common sense assumptions and 
activities. All three extracts point to and lay out the premises of a painstaking 
process of opening the self into the social, a process of identity 
transformation. The letter (and especially its second part, the ‘Existence’) 
signals that it is time to take stock and re-visit the biographical and 
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commemorative underpinnings of that identity transformation. The ‘Existence’ 
offers a chronological/biographical journey – from the first encounters with the 
Securitate, through becoming an informer to, ultimately, being put ‘under 
surveillance’. 
 
[4] “I don’t remember whether and about whom I was asked immediately for 
information notes. But I have found at CNSAS an Annex Report Note to nr. 00592/7 
from 18.01.1979 written by cpt. Campeanu Corneliu, counter-information officer of 
U.M. 01241 Ineu (where I completed my military service between October 1978 and 
March 1980) the following paragraphs: On 29.03.1976 Antohi Sorin was recruited as 
a collaborator of the Securitate organ receiving the conspirational name of ‘Valeriu’ 
(in fact, ‘Valentin’; my note) and has been used for information surveillance at the 
professional training course of Tehnoton plant in Iasi … Antohi Sorin has provided a 
number of ten information notes from 16.04.1976 to 15.05.1978, all containing 
general information about the general mood of the class.” 	  	  
Once the category ‘informer’ is on the record, category-tied activities, such as 
writing ‘information notes’ become relevant, appear on cue (Eglin & Hester, 
2003). In [4] one can notice how retrospective knowledge claims are handled 
in sensitive ways (see Edwards, 1997) and organizationally relevant products 
are used to substantiate the point (‘I don’t remember whether and about 
whom … but I have found at CNSAS5  an Annex Report Note…’). The 
document is not a simple aid to remembering ‘forgotten’ details, but rather a 
mediating tool between the person’s identity and biography and an 
organizational accomplishment of accountability. The document is not 
presented unaccompanied by a reflective commentary. We find out that ‘Ineu’ 
is the name of the place where the writer has completed his military service 
(dates are relevant, biography is on the record, again) and that his 
conspirational name is in fact ‘Valentin’ and not ‘Valeriu’ (the name in the 
document is treated as a small mistake, but one without consequence). What 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 The CNSAS is the National Council for the Study of the Securitate Archives. 
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is especially relevant in this case is the detail of the number of information 
notes written and the nature of their content. The document becomes 
significant for the inferences on the moral character of the person that it 
makes available (and is invoked to substantiate retrospectively his other claim 
from the ‘Essence’, of not having harmed/injured anyone of those on whom he 
provided information notes).  Although the narrator might be seen as evading 
remembering directly and faithfully the issue of how many notes were written 
and what was their tone and content, apparently, the matter of the issue is not 
evaded, but it is substantiated with reference to a relevant organizational 
product (an annex to a report). In this way, personal memory is indexed as 
‘practically unavailable’ (Lynch and Bogen, 1996) for scrutiny.  
The official archive of the Securitate is a potential place of discovery 
(Featherstone, 2006), a ‘privileged space’ (Lynch, 1999), from where 
biographically and institutionally relevant products can be carefully selected to 
support the perspective offered by the narrator. We are not told about when 
and how discoveries took place, but what is important are the inferences that 
can be drawn from the adduced evidence with regard to dispositions, 
intentions, moral character and identity of the person. The narrator can point 
to documents for the inferences they make available. There is a clear sense 
that documents are being called upon not simply as props to a sluggish and 
failing memory, but tailored precisely for the occasion of their use and with 
regard to current (and past) accountability concerns. In the apparent 
‘absence’ of personal memories, documents constitute and at the same 
create a ‘public standard of memorability’ (Lynch and Bogen, 1996).  
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[5] “From Autumn of 1976, the Securitate officer who was in charge of me was a 
certain lt. Rotaru Vasile … I have found in one of my notebooks a note from 6 
October 1976 from which one can infer that lt. Rotaru has been already looking for 
me: ‘I am increasingly concerned regarding my future. How on earth could I escape 
through their fingers?’. On the 2nd of December I was writing that I was on Triumfului 
street to see lt. Rotaru, bumping into a colleague who was there for the same ill-fated 
reason; I quote: ‘Despicable thing, but if, forced, I have joined the game, there is 
nothing I can do’. On the 14th of December 1976 I was to meet lt. Rotaru, at 10, in 
what looked like a bachelor’s flat (his? a conspirative house?), just opposite ‘Cotnari’ 
restaurant. I have found a more elliptic mention on the same Rotaru towards the end 
of January 1977” 
 	  
The rhetoric of ‘discovery’ in extract [5] is similar to the one identified in 
extract [4].  In extract [5] one can notice the use of the personal ‘archive’ as 
‘memory device’ (Featherstone, 2006). Information from the personal archive 
can be used to supplement, challenge, correct, the “public record” of the 
official archive. The plausibility of recall and accountability of actions is 
grounded in and fashioned by the personal archive. The facts of the matter 
are not simply remembered, but, in a way, ‘re-thought’ or ‘re-felt’ to use 
Shotter’s (1990) terms. Details ‘retrieved’ from the personal archive are 
brought into play rhetorically through reference to mental states (‘I was 
concerned …’) and also contain moral positioning and evaluations 
(Despicable thing, but …’) that make available various inferences related the 
writer’s moral character and its agency6. The official and personal archives 
contain items with determinate, yet open, uses and readings. A certain kind of 
‘applied deconstruction’ (Lynch and Bogen, 1996) seems to be at work here. 
The writer exploits the personal and public record, notices gaps, and fashions 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 The writer can be said to reflexively problematize the natural tendency to treat what people 
say about the past as a report of an actual experience – a pre-existing “memory trace” – what 
researchers refer to as the ‘archival’ model of memory (see Brockmeier, 2010). 
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an accountability space for justifying (accountable) actions (like having 
informed on others).  
The account is framed as a self-dialogue or self-interrogation. The 
writer is the ‘interrogator’ who is trying to get himself to making admissions 
about his own past and biography. He dramatizes, he ‘stages’ remembering 
as a vernacular activity. The written records need to be interpreted, especially 
as what the records “say” is not decided beforehand. His self-interrogation 
provides the ground for managing moral inferences about the self. The 
various rhetorical questions used create ad-hoc dilemmas and scenarios of 
experience. By turning oneself upon oneself, he is working up his own moral 
status as participant and witness to his own life. The standards he uses for 
working up his status are contestable, defeasible, etc. but they are 
nonetheless public. As self-interrogator he does not simply present the reader 
with biographical details, but rather uses his own utterances, notes, 
experiences, as interrogative scaffolding for building a self-defense. He prods 
and enlists his own memory by relying on a previously experienced world of 
feelings, beliefs, moral emotions that carry implications for (his present) moral 
character. It can be argued that the role of textual interpositions (personal 
notes) is that of controlling the tension between remembering, responsibility 
and public record of wrongdoing 7 . He works within and with a “dense 
intertextual field” (Lynch and Bogen, 1996; see also Smith, 1999), vernacular 
and official, that frames the dialogical (self-dialogical) production of the public 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Using personal notes positions personal recollections into a (psychological) narrative of 
identity that can counter, as it were, the official version of the Securitate and manage the 
concerns of a potentially doubting, suspicious audience/readership. References to personal 
notes not only offer an alternative construction of ‘facts’, but also an alternative, moral-
psychological perspective on the self, one which is not present in the ‘official’ records. 
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apology. What he tries to do is to reconfigure, reset, subvert “the relations of 
hermeneutic authority” (Lynch, 1999, p. 82), forms of privileged access to 
knowledge, modes of reading of biography from documents.  
The analysis of extracts [4] and [5] shows how a different perspective 
on apologia can be obtained by taking into consideration how the text of the 
confession is organized so as to potentially persuade readers of the relevance 
of a particular ‘reading’. These are examples of how one can learn more 
about apologia as a social practice by focusing on what the writer does with 
their writing, how the self, context and actions are justified, how different 
scenarios of action and accountability are introduced, how particular versions 
of the world are constructed.  	  
[6] “I resigned myself to a lowest order morality, trying never to give information that 
would truly injure someone’s interests, be it a friend or simple acquaintance. When 
the dossiers regarding the 1980-1982 period will surface, I shall be able to prove this 
claim; I shall be able to complete the story that I start telling now. Until then, 
everything remains a simple excuse of an informer.” 	  
 
In the particular case of having ‘collaborated’ with the Securitate, the narrator 
shows an orientation to how describing the past is not a neutral matter, but 
implicates a range of potential (and sometimes, competing) accountable 
descriptions associated with being a certain type of person. The relationship 
to the past is an unfinished business and, in this particular case, the past and 
the identity of the person can only be made whole through the mediation of a 
documentary reality: the surfacing of ‘dossiers regarding the 1980-1982 
period’ (see extract [6]). There is a sense that the label and negative 
inferences on moral character will stick until further documentary evidence is 
brought into play. Completing the story is a way of challenging the (deviant) 
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identity ‘informer’ and the process of identity demotion itself. What is not 
present, not yet available is more significant than what is already on the 
record8. As in the previous examples, individual memory is not the only 
“support” for the account, official records are used to establish the 
interpretative frames “for confirming and elaborating upon recollections” 
(Lynch, 2009, p. 97). The narrator works backwards from the document to 
what must have been the case. He reflexively alludes to the idea that “the 
past is not something a witness has available in the form of a concrete 
representation of an event; describing the past implicates a range of 
claimable, assertable, and disclaimable rights and responsibilities” (Lynch and 
Bogen, 1996, p. 192).  
  [7] “A lot of … questions persist, the flow of remembering can’t quite advance 
without new concrete elements. I will wait for a while for the documents from the 
CNSAS … here we are dealing with a commemorative beginning, where the essence 
has been told without rest, and the existence – the realm of nuances and details – 
has only been sketched.”  
 
‘Mea culpa’ is not just a simple confession of guilt or remorse; it is part 
of a process of re-writing of identity and memory, a process that involves (and 
at the same time, constitutes) the various relationships and tensions that get 
established between individual and social/organizational memory. As in [6], in 
[7] it is intimated that organizational records (the official archive) contains the 
seeds of retrospective as well as prospective histories. Extracts [6] and [7] 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Akin to an ethnographer, the narrator retains the right to shift between the reflective 
commentary (the perspective of personal memory) and that of the organizationally ratified 
document, in order to compare and contrast the personal ‘inside’ and the organizational 
‘outside’. Official documents and personal notes become ‘dialogical objects’, integral part of a 
conversation with the personal and political past. Invested with meaning and biographical 
relevance, they represent symbolic resources in the process of activating a 
reflexive/dialogical self (Bertau, 2007). 
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show that remembering is a social practice not only for the analyst, but for the 
apologist too. Apologists negotiate versions of their past experience by 
drawing on ‘mediating objects’ (documents, common narratives, diaries, etc.). 
Apologies are usually accompanied by “pleas for closure”, yet the narrator is 
unable to close the hermeneutic circle opened by the ‘archive’. Public 
knowledge of a person’s deeds has the power to demote the person to a 
lower moral type (Garfinkel 1956) and ‘keep’ it there.  the narrator struggles 
against an imputation of a deviant moral essence. The moral of the story is 
that passage through institutions (like the Securitate) can have both dramatic 
and subtle effects. The moral self-portrait (and associated moral implications) 
is unfinished and yet undecidable. Individual memory needs to be 
complemented by organizational memory; the former is constructed as 
subjective, the latter presupposed to be objective. Organizational memory is 
there to confirm, use, erase, or deny the „historical record”, to promote a 
different version of ’reality’ identity, one that may bring absolution. As 
testimonies can be framed as “remembered” or “recalled”9, so the public 
apology performs a “theater of memory” (Lynch and Bogen, 1996) as details 
from the past are adduced to complete the biographical and identity puzzle.  	  	  
Conclusion  	  
There are at least three major implications for analyzing apologia as 
discourse. First, apologia can be studied as a public performative 
phenomenon, the outcome of complex discursive actions and discursive 
accomplishments. Second, the sociocultural/discursive organization of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 For the role of memory in testimony see chapter 6 in Lynch and Bogen (1996), and chapter 
(Byford) this volume. 
	   21	  
apologies can be studied as constructive of various argumentative and moral 
identity spaces and positions. Moral identity is not constituted in a vacuum, 
but through the use of “open-ended” categories, cultural presuppositions 
about moral transgression, the workings of individual, social, institutional 
memory, textual mediation, etc. Third, individual memory can be studied as an 
active socio-communicative practice of instituting and tying the meaning of the 
past to ongoing relevant social activities in talk and text. If public apologies 
are ways of mobilizing the past in the present, then one can investigate them 
in terms of the “modes of access to the past” they open, and the forms of 
‘experience’ in relation to self and others that are facilitated (Brown, 2012).   
It could be argued that it matters less whether public apologies are 
prospective or retrospective expressions of regret, ‘anticipatory’ or ‘remedial’. 
The problem is less whether apologies are felicitous or not, but what they do 
in a space of public visibility.	   Although it is often assumed that apologia 
involves one person (the “communicator”) conveying a message to one or 
more others (the “audience”), in practice, the management of political 
communication, persuasion, image restoration, is far more complex. As this 
chapter has shown, speakers and writers can project a variety of alignments 
(footings) in relation to the words that they uttering, the identities that they are 
embodying, the texts and intertextual fields in which they are operating. Social 
actors construct and mobilize multiple repertoires of self-protective or self-
affirming rhetoric. In doing so, they perpetuate, defend or attack, different 
(multiple) versions of lay morality and societal moral meanings.  
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Key points: summary 
- The chapter outlines a methodological framework for researching 
apologia as a discursively and culturally constructed phenomenon. 
- The chapter argues that research should turn to the detailed and 
careful study of apologia as discourse and address it as a topic in its 
own right.  
- Apologia is considered a social activity and the product of social and 
socio-communicative practices involved in ‘image restoration’ and 
social-relational accountability management. By mobilizing events, 
people, identities, categories, social relations, institutions, memory, 
apologies participate to and mould the form and consequences of 
image restoration discourses. 
- Researchers need to be concerned with the rhetorical structure of 
apologies and their effectiveness, as well as with the moral problems 
that public apologies raise for apologists and the communities to which 
they belong. 
 
Further reading 
There are quite a few publications that deal with apologia and related issues. 
Tavuchis (1991) and Bok (1984) are classic texts, although depending on 
your orientation you may find them more or less relevant. Benoit (1995) 
includes a very useful outline of rhetorical approaches to image restoration, 
social psychological work on accounts, accompanied by very interesting case 
studies mostly drawn from the US.  Meier (1998) is a systematic attempt at 
outlining the state of knowledge regarding apologies. Lakoff (2001) is a call for 
	   23	  
interdisciplinary ways of looking at apologies from the perspective of 
discourse analysis. Some other titles that offer valuable reflections on 
apologies of different kinds include Brooks (1999), Miller (1999), Blaney and 
Benoit (2001), Lazare (2004) and Payne (2008). In this chapter I have 
employed a discursive approach to analyzing public apologies. For a general 
overview of the discursive approach (especially as it is developed in social 
psychology) see Hepburn and Wiggins (2007) and the September 2012 
special issue on ‘discursive psychology’ of the British Journal of Social 
Psychology edited by Augoustinos and Tileaga. On researching memory in 
sociocultural psychology see the excellent exposition in Middleton and Brown 
(2005). Tileaga (2009 and 2012) and Augoustinos et al. (2011) provide useful 
examples of discursive studies on public apologies, and can be read in 
conjunction with this chapter.	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